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NOTE 
Can COPPA Work?  An Analysis           
of the Parental Consent Measures          




Over recent years, Internet-based commerce has experienced 
considerable growth.  Today, almost every business recognizes the 
need to incorporate the Internet into its business model.  Beyond 
providing financial efficiency, the Internet serves as an 
unprecedented commercial tool for businesses to market and sell 
products. 
Many of the businesses and commercial entities on the Internet 
contain websites with chat rooms, discussion boards, instant 
messaging capability, and forms of technology that collect 
registration and other information from site visitors.  Further, 
because of the nature of their products, many sites target children 
as their customers.  Other sites find curious children among their 
visitors, although the sites do not direct their content to children. 
Indeed, children represent a large and rapidly growing segment 
of online consumers.1  As of 1998, almost 10 million U.S. children 
had online access, with over 4 million using the Internet from 
 
 *  Cornell University, B.A., 1996; Fordham University School of Law, J.D., 2000.  
The author thanks Andrew Goldner and Prof. Joel Reidenberg for their helpful 
comments.  Many thanks to Thaddeus J. Tracy for his editorial assistance. 
 1 See Interactive Consumers Research Report, Vol. 4, No. 5, at 1, 4 (1997) 
(discussing results of FIND/SVPs 1997 American Internet User Survey).  Children use 
the Web for a wide variety of activities, including homework, informal learning, 
browsing, playing games, corresponding with electronic pen pals by e-mail, placing 
messages on electronic bulletin boards, and participating in chat rooms.  Id. 
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school and 5.7 million from home.2  Children are also avid 
consumers and represent a large and powerful segment of the 
marketplace.3  Their growing presence online, therefore, creates 
enormous opportunities for marketers to promote their products 
and services to an eager audience.4  Some commentators, however, 
submit that children under the age of thirteen do not have the 
developmental capacity to understand the nature of a websites 
request for information and its privacy implications.5  As a result, 
many commentators have advocated governmental regulation in an 
effort to safeguard childrens privacy interests when they provide 
personal information over the Internet.6 
 
 2 See id. at 1, 2 (noting that the number of children online increased nearly five-fold 
from Fall 1995 to Spring 1997). 
 3 See James U. McNeal, Tapping the Three Kids Markets, AMERICAN 
DEMOGRAPHICS (Apr. 1998) (visited May 12, 2000) 
<http://www.demographics.com/Publications/AD/98_ad/9804_ad/ad980429.htm> 
(estimating that billions of dollars a year are spent in marketing to children to influence 
the expenditure of billions more).  For example, in 1997 children aged 4 through 12 spent 
U.S. $24.4 billion themselves and children aged 2 through 14 may have directly 
influenced spending by their parents in an amount as much as U.S. $188 billion.  Id. 
 4 See Robin Raskin, What do Kids Want?, FAMILY PC MAGAZINE, May 1998, at 17 
(noting that most childrens websites target children ages 8 to 11).  Teens tend to visit the 
same sites that adults visit.  Id.; see also Pre-Teen Publishers Ponder Privacy and 
Payment Puzzles, Mins New Media Report (Apr. 10, 2000) available in LEXIS, News 
Library, Philips File (reporting that pre-teen market represents most wired and affluent 
generation in human history).  Pre-teens have not been able to buy online in the past and 
merchants have a chance to capture them as loyal customers by partnering with a website 
that permits online shopping.  Id. 
 5 See Childrens Online Privacy Protection Rule, 64 Fed. Reg. 59,888, 59,900 
(noting American Psychological Association study); see also Lynn Burke, A Chilling 
Wave Hits Schools, Apr. 5, 2000,  
<http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,35299,00.html> (reporting that children 12 
years old and younger might fill out website information request forms in order to receive 
prizes without understanding that such prizes are obtainable without providing personal 
information).  For instance, an 11-year old using the e-mail program of the Working 
Against Violence Everywhere program must provide his or her state, gender, age, and 
selected educational and vocational goals before receiving the fee e-mail feature.  Id.  
Importantly, a child of this age may have no sense of when he or she should protect his or 
her identity.  Id. 
 6 Childrens Online Privacy Protection Rule, 64 Fed. Reg. at 59,889 (noting Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC) comment period in response to creation of Childrens Online 
Privacy Protection Act (COPPA)).  The FTCs comment period yielded 14 comments 
from different industry sources.  Id.; see also Consumer Privacy On The World Wide 
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On October 21, 1998, President Clinton accordingly signed 
into law the Childrens Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998 
(COPPA or the Act).7  The intent of the Act is to regulate the 
collection and use of personally identifiable information from 
children under the age of thirteen (children) via the Internet.8  
The Act directs the Federal Trade Commission (the FTC) to put 
rules into operation that effectuate the Acts mandates.  The FTC 
issued its final rules (the Rules) in October 1999 and the Act 
became effective on April 21, 2000.9 
 
Web, Hearing Before The House Comm. on Commerce, Subcomm. on 
Telecommunications, Trade and Consumer Protection, July 21, 1998, 105th Congress 
(testimony of Robert Pitofsky, Commissioner of the FTC) (last visited Mar. 30, 2000) 
<http://www.ftc.gov/os/1998/9807/privac98.htm#N7> [hereinafter Consumer Privacy] 
(noting that consumers are especially concerned about collection of personal information 
from children). As Commissioner Pitofsky explained: 
These practices raise especially troubling privacy and safety concerns because 
of the particular vulnerability of children, the immediacy and ease with which 
information can be collected from them, and the ability of the online medium to 
circumvent the traditional gatekeeping role of the parent.  Indeed, consumers 
strongly favor limiting the collection and use of personal information from 
children online. A recent survey showed that 97% of parents whose children 
use the Internet believe Web sites should not sell or rent personal information 
relating to children, and 72% object to a Web sites requesting a childs name 
and address when the child registers at the site, even if such information is used 
only internally. 
In sum, it is clear that consumers care deeply about the privacy and security of 
their own, and their childrens, personal information in the online environment 
and are looking for greater protections. Until meaningful and effective 
consumer privacy protections are implemented in the online marketplace, 
consumers may remain wary of engaging in electronic commerce, and this new 
marketplace will fail to reach its full potential. 
Id. (testimony of Robert Pitofsky, Commissioner of the FTC) (citations omitted). 
 7 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 6501 - 6505 (1999). 
 8 See Childrens Online Privacy Protection Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 312.1 (1999) 
(implementing COPPA).  This section prohibits unfair or deceptive acts or practices in 
connection with the collection, use, and/or disclosure of personal information from and 
about children on the Internet.  Id. 
 9 Id.; see also Childrens Online Privacy Protection Rule, 64 Fed. Reg. at 59,889 
(noting FTCs position in drafting final Rule).   
For its part, the FTC has taken very seriously the concerns expressed about 
maintaining childrens access to the Internet, preserving the interactivity of the 
medium, and minimizing the potential burdens of compliance on companies, 
parents, and children.  The Commission believes that the final Rule strikes the 
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This Note examines the adequacy of COPPAs suggested 
parental consent measures in light of the Acts overall goal to 
protect childrens privacy interests.  Part I discusses the impetus 
and intent behind the creation of COPPA.  This Part also outlines 
the structure of the Act and defines some of its key terms.  Part II 
focuses on COPPAs parental consent measures, evaluating their 
content, form, and adequacy.  Part III argues that the parental 
consent measures prescribed by the Act are impractical and 
inadequate methods to protect childrens privacy interests.  This 
Note concludes that COPPA ultimately fails as a form of federal 
regulation because it does not serve to improve commercial 
practices and activityit serves drastically to impair them. 
I. THE CHILDRENS ONLINE PRIVACY PROTECTION ACT OF 1998 
A. The Impetus to Create COPPA 
In May 1996, a consumer watchdog group known as the Center 
for Media Education petitioned the FTC to investigate the online 
website KidsCom.com (KidsCom) and bring an enforcement 
action against it, asserting that KidsComs data collection practices 
violated section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act10 
concerning unfair/deceptive trade practices.11  In July 1997, the 
FTC completed its investigation and issued its findings in an 
enforcement letter (the KidsCom Letter or Letter).12  The FTC 
 
appropriate balance between these concerns and the Acts goals of protecting 
childrens information in the online environment.  It looks forward to 
continuing to work with industry, consumer groups, and parents to ensure 
widespread compliance in as efficient a manner as possible, to educate the 
public about online privacy protections, and to assess the Rules effectiveness 
on a periodic basis. 
Id. 
 10 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1994).  Section 5(a) of the FTC Act provides that unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce are declared unlawful.  Id. 
 11 Parry Aftab & Nancy Savitt, Children, Data and the Web; New Rules Stress 
Privacy, Safety, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 15, 1999, at T4 (reporting that KidsCom collected 
information from children without accurately disclosing purpose, and that it failed to 
disclose that it was paid to endorse certain products). 
 12 Petition Requesting Investigation of, and Enforcement Action Against 
SpectraCom, Inc., FTC Letter, (last visited Mar. 30, 2000) 
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determined in the letter that KidsComs disclosure practices were 
inadequate and misleading.13  In issuing this ruling, the FTC 
publicly announced its guidelines for data collection from children 
on the Internet for the first time.14  Furthermore, after the FTC 
 
<http://www.ftc.gov/os/1997/9707/cenmed.htm>  [hereinafter KidsCom Letter].  In its 
letter, the FTC concluded that: 
[I]t would likely be an unfair practice in violation of Section 5 to collect 
personally identifiable information, such as name, e-mail address, home 
address or phone number, from children and sell or otherwise disclose such 
identifiable information to third parties without providing parents with 
adequate notice . . . and an opportunity to control the collection and use of the 
information. 
Id. 
 13 Id.  The FTC noted that: 
It is a deceptive practice to represent that a Web site is collecting personally 
identifiable information from a child for a particular purpose (e.g., to earn 
points to redeem a premium), when the information will also be used for 
another purpose which parents would find material, in the absence of a clear 
and prominent disclosure to that effect. 
Id.; see also Aftab & Savitt, supra note 11 (describing how FTC declined to take punitive 
action against KidsCom, however, since it had already changed its data collection 
practices and cooperated in the investigation). 
 14 See KidsCom Letter, supra note 12 (stating that KidsCom shared information 
collected from children at its website with third parties); see also Aftab & Savitt, supra 
note 11.  The shared information was provided to third parties only in an anonymous, 
aggregate form.  KidsCom Letter, supra note 12.  In issuing its decision, The FTC relied 
on section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (the FTC Act), that prohibits unfair 
and deceptive practices.  Id.  The FTC stated its four principles relating to data collection 
from children online.  Id.  The first principle was stated as follows: 
It is a deceptive practice to represent that a Web site is collecting personally 
identifiable information from a child for a particular purpose (e.g., to earn 
points to redeem a premium), when the information will also be used for 
another purpose which parents would find material, in the absence of a clear 
and prominent disclosure to that effect. 
Id.  The second principle stated that adequate notice must be given to a parent when 
collecting personally identifiable information from a child, because of the childs limited 
ability to understand the disclosure.  Id.  Adequate notice requires disclosure of (1) who 
is collecting the personally identifiable information; (2) what information is being used 
and for what purpose it is being used; (3) whether it will be disclosed to third parties, and 
if so, to whom and in what form; (4) how parents can prevent the retention, use or 
disclosure of that information.  Id.  The third principle generally concerns safety.  Id.  
Section 5 of the FTC Act deems a practice unfair if it causes or is likely to cause 
substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable and is not outweighed 
by countervailing benefits to consumers or competition.  Id.  This test applies to Internet 
child safety because the disclosure of a childs personal information introduces the risk 
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issued the KidsCom letter, it broadened its principles to include 
offline consent for children twelve years old and younger as well  
as any personal information shared online, in chat rooms, or in 
similar third-party communications.15 
In March 1998, the FTC presented its Privacy On-Line Report 
to Congress, documenting the online collection of personal 
information from children.16  In its report, the FTC informed 
Congress of the need for parents to better understand the risks to 
their childrens privacy on-line, as well as the need for parental 
consent concerning the collection and disclosure of their childrens 
personal information.17  Congress enacted COPPA in October 
1998 in response to this Report, and in light of the evidence of 
continued lack of industry compliance with the principles 
articulated in the KidsCom letter.18 
B.  COPPAs Mandates 
Under the Act, operators of websites directed at children, or 
who knowingly collect personally identifiable information from 
 
that a third party may harm the child.  Id.  The FTCs fourth principle criticized 
KidsComs endorsement practices as misleading and deceptive.  Id.  Specifically, 
KidsCom failed to clearly and conspicuously disclose that the product information it 
displayed to children was in fact solicited from manufacturers and printed in exchange 
for in-kind payment.  Id. 
 15 See Aftab & Savitt, supra note 11 (explaining that FTC jurisdiction extends to any 
site that collects and stores childrens personal information, even an e-mail address). 
 16 See Internet Privacy, Hearing before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 
Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property, Mar. 26, 1998, 105th Congress 
(testimony of David Medine, Associate Director for Credit Practices, Bureau of 
Consumer Protection, FTC) (last visited Mar. 30, 2000) 
<http://www.ftc.gov/os/1998/9803/privacy.htm>  [hereinafter Internet Privacy] 
(reporting that collection of information from and about children who use the Internet 
deserves special attention); see also Aftab & Savitt, supra note 11 (noting FTCs 
concerns that collection of personal information from children under the age of 13 
without informed parental consent would be deceptive trade practice).  The FTC reported 
to Congress that even in chatrooms, children innocently and without request may reveal 
where they live or go to school or their real e-mail addresses.  Id. 
 17 Internet Privacy, supra note 16 (testimony of David Medine, Associate Director 
for Credit Practices, Bureau of Consumer Protection, FTC). 
 18 Aftab & Savitt, supra note 11; 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501 - 6505 (1999). 
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children, are required to (1) provide notice19 on their website of 
their information collection practices;20 (2) obtain verifiable 
parental consent for the collection, use and/or disclosure of 
personal information from children;21 (3) provide a parent, upon 
request, with the ability to review the personal information 
collected from a child;22 (4) provide a parent, upon request, with 
 
 19 See Childrens Online Privacy Protection Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 312.4 (1999) 
(describing necessary notice practices under COPPA).  Section 312.4 states that: 
[A]n operator of a website or online service directed to children must post a 
link to a notice of its information practices with regard to children on the home 
page of its website or online service and at each area on the website or online 
service where personal information is collected from children. 
16 C.F.R. § 312.4(b) (1999).  The link to the notice must be conspicuous and it must 
clearly state that it concerns the online services information practices regarding children.  
16 C.F.R. § 312.4(1)(i)-(iii); Childrens Online Privacy Protection Rule, 64 Fed. Reg. 
59,888, 59,894 (1999).  The FTC has interpreted this to mean that the link must stand out 
and be noticeable to the websites visitors through, for example, a larger font size in a 
different color on a contrasting background.  64 Fed. Reg. at 59,894.  Importantly, the 
FTC does not consider a link that is in small print at the bottom of the home page, or a 
link that is indistinguishable from a number of other, adjacent links as sufficient under 
this provision.  Id.  The content of the notice must state the [t]he name, address, 
telephone number, and e-mail address of all operators collecting or maintaining personal 
information from children through the website or online service.  16 C.F.R. § 
312.4(2)(i). 
Further, the notice must state the types of personal information collected, § 312.4(2)(ii), 
how it is to be used, § 312.4(2)(iii), and disclosure practices. § 312.4(2)(iv).  Last, it is 
instructive to note that the FTC has applied a reasonable consumer standard in 
evaluating whether a notice is clearly and understandably written.  Childrens Online 
Privacy Protection Rule, 64 Fed. Reg. at 59,894 n.91.  Because the notices required by 
the Act are intended for parents, the Commission will look at whether they are written 
such that a reasonable parent can read and comprehend them.  64 Fed. Reg. at 59,894 
n.91. 
 20 See Childrens Online Privacy Protection Rule, 64 Fed. Reg. at 59,894 n.95 (noting 
that several commentators supported use of other mechanisms for providing notice, such 
as pop-up or interstitial pages, which typically appear temporarily when visitors move 
from one part of a website to another).  Pop-up or interstitial pages, however, will only 
satisfy the notice requirements if they are clear, prominent, and easily accessible to users, 
i.e., they do not disappear after the initial viewing or users can re-access them through a 
clear and prominent link on the home page.  Id. 
 21 See 16 C.F.R. § 312.5(a)(1) (stating that the website provider must obtain 
verifiable parental consent before any collection, use, and/or disclosure of personal 
information from children).  Parental consent is also necessary for any material changes 
to the collection, use, or disclosure practices that occur thereafter.  Id.  See infra, Part II 
and III for a more detailed analysis of this section. 
 22 See 16 C.F.R. § 312.6(a) (stating that the operator of a website or online service 
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the opportunity to prevent the use or maintenance of personal 
information that was collected on or after April 21, 2000, or the 
future collection of personal information from that child;23 (5) limit 
collection of personal information required for a childs 
participation in an online game, prize offer, or other activity to 
information that is reasonably necessary for the activity;24 and (6) 
establish and maintain reasonable procedures to protect the 
confidentiality, security, and integrity of the personal information 
collected from children.25 Importantly, the Act establishes a 
reasonableness standard as the proper measure of compliance.26 
C. Key Definitions of COPPA 
The mandates of the Act only apply to operators of websites or 
online services that are either directed to or that collect personal 
information from children.  Importantly, website operators must 
 
must provide a childs personal information to parent for parents review).  Upon request 
of the parent, the online service operator must provide [a] description of the specific 
types or categories of personal information collected from children by the operator, such 
as name, address, telephone number, e-mail address, hobbies, and extracurricular 
activities  16 C.F.R. § 312.6(a)(1). 
Furthermore, the online service operator must ensure that the person requesting the 
information is, in fact, the parent of the child, § 312.6(a)(3)(i), and that the means 
employed to carry out this provision are not unduly burdensome.  Id. 
 23 16 C.F.R. § 312.6(a)(2) (noting that parent must be provided [t]he opportunity at 
any time to refuse to permit the operators further use or future online collection of 
personal information from that child, and to direct the operator to delete the childs 
personal information).  Furthermore, an operator may terminate any service provided to 
a child whose parent has refused, under paragraph (a)(2) of this section, to permit the 
operators further use or collection of personal information from his or her child or has 
directed the operator to delete the childs personal information.  16 C.F.R. § 312.6(c). 
 24 See 16 C.F.R. § 312.7 (stating that [a]n operator is prohibited from conditioning a 
childs participation in a game, the offering of a prize, or another activity on the childs 
disclosing more personal information than is reasonably necessary to participate in such 
activity.). 
 25 See 16 C.F.R. § 312.8 (entitled Confidentiality, security, and integrity of personal 
information collected from children). 
 26 See 16 C.F.R. § 312.2 (requiring website operators to make a reasonable effort to 
obtain verifiable parental consent); 16 C.F.R. § 312.4(c) (providing that website operators 
must make reasonable efforts to ensure that parents receive notice of the websites 
practices concerning the collection, use, or disclosure of childrens personal information); 
16 C.F.R. § 312.6(b) (providing safeharbor for website operators who follow 
reasonable procedures in disclosing personal information for parental review). 
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adequately secure their site in order to ensure the integrity and 
confidentiality of the childs online information.  The exact 
meaning of COPPAs provisions, however, is best understood in 
light of their definitions. 
1.  Operator 
To be an operator, the website must be used for commercial 
purposes, and must collect or maintain personal information from 
or about its users.27  The Rules broadly define an operator to 
include all persons who operate a website, as well as those on 
whose behalf such a website is hosted and/or maintained.28  Where 
more than one party has access to, or control over information 
collected, all are jointly and severally responsible for satisfying the 
mandates of the Rules.29 
2.  Directed at Children 
The FTC considers a number of different factors when 
 
 27 See 16 C.F.R. § 312.2 (stating that collecting information concerns gathering 
any personal information from a child by any means).  The means by which 
information can be collected includes requesting that the child submit personal 
information.  Id.  Other means include [e]nabling children to make personal information 
publicly available through a chat room, message board, or other means, except where the 
operator deletes all individually identifiable information from postings by children before 
they are made public, and also deletes such information from the operators records . . . .  
Id.  Utilizing cookies to identify the child also falls under this definition.  Id. 
 28 Id.  Operator is defined as: 
[A]ny person who operates a website located on the Internet or an online 
service and who collects or maintains personal information from or about the 
users of or visitors to such website or online service, or on whose behalf such 
information is collected or maintained, where such website or online service is 
operated for commercial purposes, including any person offering products or 
services for sale through that website or online service, involving commerce. 
Id.  But see Childrens Online Privacy Protection Rule, 64 Fed. Reg. 59,888 59,891 
(1999) (noting that entities which merely provide access to the Internet, without 
providing content or collecting information from children, are not considered operators).  
Thus, ISPs and cable operators that offer Internet access are not operators under the 
Rule.  64 Fed. Reg. at 59,891 n.52.  One wonders whether online auctioneers fall under 
this definition. 
 29 16 C.F.R. § 312.2.  An operator can include any individual, partnership, 
corporation, trust, estate, cooperative, association, or other entity.  Id. 
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determining whether a website or online service, or any portion 
thereof, is directed at children.30  While none are dispositive, the 
FTC will consider (1) whether a designated childrens area 
exists;31 (2) the subject matter, visual or audio content, age of 
model, if any, language or other similar characteristics;32 and (3) 
whether games, puppets, animated characters or other child-
oriented activities and incentives are used.33 
An operator of a general interest website or online service that 
is partially directed to children is required to satisfy the mandates 
of the Rules for only that portion of the site which is directed at 
children.34  If the website or online service is not directed at 
children, the operator will, nonetheless, be subject to the mandates 
of the Act if the operator knows that particular users are under the 
age of thirteen.35 
 
 30 See id. (explaining that a [w]ebsite or online service directed to children means a 
commercial website or online service, or portion thereof, that is targeted to children).  A 
commercial website or online service, however, is not subject to this provision solely 
because it refers or links to a commercial website or online service directed to children by 
using information location tools, including a directory, index, reference, pointer, or 
hypertext link.  Id. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. 
 34 See id. (modifying the scope of its provisions to commercial websites, online 
services, or portions thereof); Childrens Online Privacy Protection Rule, 64 Fed. Reg. 
59,888, 59,893 (1999) (stating that if a general audience site has a distinct childrens 
portion or area, then the operator would be required to provide the protections of the 
Rule for visitors to that portion of the site). 
 35 See 16 C.F.R. § 312.2 (noting that the Commission considers as competent and 
reliable empirical evidence the intended audience of the website); see also Childrens 
Online Privacy Protection Rule, 64 Fed. Reg. at 59,893 (describing one commentators 
concern that operators should not be able to construct veil of ignorance where operator 
can determine through questions whether visitor is a child without specifically asking for 
visitors age).  The FTC has responded, however, that it will closely examine such sites to 
determine whether they have actual knowledge that they are collecting information from 
children.  64 Fed. Reg. at 59,894.  Similarly, issues arise for websites that ask for age 
ranges that include both children and teens (e.g., a 15 and under category).  Id.  Since 
website operators can easily craft a 12 and under age range, the FTC has vowed to 
closely inspect those websites that do not offer such a range if it appears that their 
operators are trying to avoid compliance with the Rule.  Id. 
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3.  Personal Information 
The Act enumerates several forms of individually identifiable 
information that qualify as personal information.36  Furthermore, 
the Act authorizes the FTC to expand the definition to include 
other identifiers that permit physical or online contacting of a 
specific individual.  Specifically, the Rules list (1) a first and last 
name;37 (2) a home or other physical address including street name 
and name of a city or town;38 (3) an e-mail address;39 (4) a 
telephone number;40 (5) a Social Security number;41 (6) any 
persistent identifier associated with personal identifiable 
information;42 or (7) information concerning the child or the 
parents of that child that the operator collects online from the child 
and combines with a persistent identifier.43 
 
 36 See 16 C.F.R. § 312.2 (describing personal information as individually 
identifiable information about any information collected online).  Conversely, operators 
are not required to provide parental notice or seek parental consent for collection of non-
individually identifiable information that is not and will not be associated with an 
identifier.  Id. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. 
 39 See id. (identifying personal information as an e-mail address or other online 
contact information, including but not limited to an instant messaging user identifier, or a 
screen name that reveals an individuals e-mail address). 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. 
 42 See id. (stating that a persistent identifier includes cookies).  The Act identifies 
personal information as [a] persistent identifier, such as a customer number held in a 
cookie or a processor serial number, where such identifier is associated with individually 
identifiable information; or a combination of a last name or photograph of the individual 
with other information such that the combination permits physical online 
contracting. . . .  16 C.F.R. § 312.2.  This provision has raised the question of whether 
operators must ensure that a screen name chosen by a child does not contain individually 
identifiable information.  Childrens Online Privacy Protection Rule, 64 Fed. Reg. 
59,888, 59,892 n.66 (1999).  The FTC has stated that website operators do not have a 
specific duty to investigate whether a screen name contains such information.  64 Fed. 
Reg. at 59,892 n.66.  However, an operator could give children warnings about including 
such information in screen names, especially those screen names that will be disclosed in 
a public forum such as a chat room.  Id. 
 43 16 C.F.R. § 312.2; see also Childrens Online Privacy Protection Rule, 64 Fed. 
Reg. at 59,892 (noting that non-individually identifiable information, e.g., information 
about a childs hobbies or toys, can be associated with an identifier and, thus, fall under 
this provision).  Some child advocacy groups have suggested that the FTC remove the 
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4.  Confidentiality, Security, and Integrity of Personal 
Information 
The Rules require an operator to establish and maintain 
reasonable procedures to protect the confidentiality, security, and 
integrity of personal information collected from children.44 More 
specifically, operators must maintain adequate policies and 
procedures for protecting childrens personal information from 
loss, misuse, unauthorized access, or disclosure.45  Such 
protections may include (1) designating an individual in the 
organization to be responsible for maintaining and monitoring the 
security of the information;46 (2) requiring passwords to access the 
personal information;47 (3) installing firewalls;48 (4) utilizing 
encryption;49 (5) implementing access-control procedures in 
addition to passwords;50 and/or (6) storing the information on a 
 
phrase collected online from this provision in order to cover information that is 
submitted to an operator offline, then posted online by the operator.  64 Fed. Reg. at 
59,893 n.71.  While cognizant of the risks posed by such practices, the FTC declined to 
expand COPPA to information submitted to an operator offline.  Id. 
 44 16 C.F.R. § 312.8. 
 45 Childrens Online Privacy Protection Rule, 64 Fed. Reg. 59,906. 
 46 Id.; see also 16 C.F.R. § 312.4 (stating that in order for notice to be complete, a 
website operator must provide information concerning all operators collecting or 
maintaining personal information from children through his/her website).  Alternatively, 
the website operator may: 
[L]ist the name, address, phone number, and e-mail address of one operator 
who will respond to all inquiries from parents concerning the operators 
privacy policies and use of childrens information, as long as the names of all 
the operators collecting or maintaining personal information from children 
through the website or online service are also listed in the notice. 
16 C.F.R. § 312.4(b)(2)(i).  But see Childrens Online Privacy Protection Rule, 64 Fed. 
Reg. at 59,895 (noting that data-sharing relationships in online world change rapidly, and 
that this provision therefore causes undue burden on website operators to revise their 
parental notices with each change).  During the comment period, the FTC agreed with 
those commentators that believed that it would be burdensome for website operators to 
send numerous updated notices to parents.  64 Fed. Reg. at 59,895.  Therefore, the FTC 
modified this provision to require a new notice to the parent only where there would be a 
material change in the collection, use, and/or disclosure of personal information from the 
child.  Id. 
 47 Childrens Online Privacy Protection Rule, 64 Fed. Reg. at 59,906 n.284. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. 
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secure server that is not accessible from the Internet.51  Adherence 
to the Acts reasonableness standard52 would dictate using at 
least the customary form of such protection, not an out-of-date 




II.  A CLOSER LOOK: METHODS OF PARENTAL CONSENT 
SUGGESTED IN COPPA 
Because of particular interest among commentators concerning 
how to obtain verifiable parental consent under the Rule, the FTC 
conducted a public workshop on July 20, 1999 in order to obtain 
additional information and learn more about the views expressed.53  
The thirty-two panelists at the workshop included representatives 
from the Internet industry (including website operators and 
technology companies), as well as privacy advocates, consumer 
groups, and representatives of other government agencies.54  
Approximately 100 other parties also attended the workshop.55  
Panelists discussed methods of obtaining verifiable parental 
consent that are currently in use, whether and how e-mail could be 
used to obtain verifiable parental consent, and technologies or 
methods that are under development that could be used in the 
future to obtain verifiable parental consent.56 
 
 51 Id. 
 52 See Childrens Online Privacy Protection Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 312.8 (1999) (stating 
that a website operators security measures must be reasonable). 
 53 See Childrens Online Privacy Protection Rule, 64 Fed. Reg. at 34595 (announcing 
public workshop). 
 54 The transcript and all of the comments received in the course of the proceeding 
appear on the FTCs website at <www.ftc.gov>. References to the workshop transcript 
are cited as Speaker/affiliation (Workshop Tr. at) followed by the appropriate page 
designation.  Initial references to the comments are cited as Name of Commentator 
(Comment or Workshop comment number) at (page number). 
 55 Childrens Online Privacy Protection Rule, 64 Fed. Reg. at 59,888. 
 56 See id. (stating that workshop comment period, which ended on July 30, 1999, 
yielded 14 comments). 
WARMUND_FINAL 12/28/00  7:09 PM 
202 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol.11:189 
 
A.  Verifiable Parental Consent 
Under the Rules, an operator must obtain verifiable parental 
consent57 before any collection, use, and/or disclosure of personal 
information from children.58  Furthermore, where an operator 
materially changes its information collection and use practices, it 
must obtain verifiable parental consent to the new practice(s) 
before using the previously collected personal information.59  In 
addition, an operator must allow parents to consent to collect and 
use the childs information while agreeing not to disclose such 
information to third parties.60  The Rules, however, specifically 
 
 57 See 16 C.F.R. § 312.2 (defining obtaining verifiable consent as making any 
reasonable effort (taking into account available technology) to ensure that before personal 
information is collected from a child, a parent of the child: (a) receives notice of the 
operators personal information collection, use, and disclosure practices; and (b) 
authorizes any collection, use, and/or disclosure of the personal information). 
 58 16 C.F.R. § 312.2; see also Childrens Online Privacy Protection Rule, 64 Fed. 
Reg. at 59,898 (reporting that because the Act requires parental consent prior to any 
collection, use, and/or disclosure, the parental consent requirement applies to subsequent 
use or disclosure of information in an operators possession before the effective date of 
the Rule that is combined with the information gathered after the effective date of the 
Rule).  The FTC has made clear that: 
[N]otwithstanding any prior relationship that an operator has with the child, any 
collection of personal information by the operator after the effective date is 
covered by the Rule.  Thus, for example, if an operator collected a childs name 
and e-mail address before the effective date, but sought information regarding 
the childs street address after the effective date, the later collection would 
trigger the Rules requirements.  Similarly, if after the effective date, an 
operator continued to offer activities involving the ongoing collection and 
disclosure of personal information from children (e.g., a chatroom or message 
board), or began offering such activities for the first time, notice and consent 
would be required for all participating children regardless of whether they had 
previously registered or participated at the site. 
Id. 
 59 See 16 C.F.R. § 312.5(a)(1) (noting that consent must also be obtained for any 
material change in the collection, use, and/or disclosure practices to which the parent has 
previously consented); Childrens Online Privacy Protection Rule, 64 Fed. Reg. at 
59,899.  Originally, many commentators objected that gaining new parental consent for 
any changes to the collection, use, and/or disclosure practices would be extremely 
burdensome, especially in light of constant changes taking place in the online world, and 
unnecessary to achieve the purposes of the COPPA.  64 Fed. Reg. at 59,899.  The FTC 
responded to these complaints by requiring new parental consent only if there is a 
material change in the operators collection, use, and/or disclosure practices.  Id. 
 60 See 16 C.F.R. § 312.5(a)(2) (mandating that [a]n operator must give the parent the 
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exclude from these requirements any personally identifiable 
information collected by an operator prior to April 21, 2000.61 
The Rules provide operators with some flexibility to comply 
with these requirements.  Because the potential dangers to 
childrens data privacy vary according to how the collected 
 
option to consent to the collection and use of the childs personal information without 
consenting to disclosure of his or her personal information to third parties).  But see 
Childrens Online Privacy Protection Rule, 64 Fed. Reg. at 59,899 (noting that this 
provision interferes with an operators right to terminate service to a child whose parent 
refuses to permit further use, maintenance, or collection of data).  The FTC nevertheless 
made no changes to this provision.  After considering many comments, the FTC 
concluded that: 
[G]iving parents a choice about whether information can be disclosed to third 
parties implements the clear goals of the COPPA to give parents more control 
over their childrens personal information, limit the unnecessary collection and 
dissemination of that information, and preserve childrens access to the online 
medium.  The Act requires consent for the collection, use, or disclosure of 
information, thus expressing the intent that parents be able to control all of 
these practices.  Although the Act does not explicitly grant parents a separate 
right to control disclosures to third parties, the Commission believes that this is 
a reasonable and appropriate construction of the Act, particularly in light of the 
rulemaking record and other considerations. 
Indeed, the record shows that disclosures to third parties are among the most 
sensitive and potentially risky uses of childrens personal information.  This is 
especially true in light of the fact that children lose even the protections of the 
Act once their information is disclosed to third parties.  The Commission 
believes that these risks warrant providing parents with the ability to prevent 
disclosures to third parties without foreclosing their children from participating 
in online activities.  In addition, the Act prohibits collecting more information 
than is reasonably necessary to participate in an activity, showing 
Congressional intent to limit information practices (such as disclosures to third 
parties) that do not facilitate a childs experience at the site.  Finally, the 
Commission believes that allowing parents to limit disclosures to third parties 
will increase the likelihood that they will grant consent for other activities and 
therefore preserve childrens access to the medium. 
64 Fed. Reg. at 59,899 (citations omitted). 
 61 Childrens Online Privacy Protection Rule, 64 Fed. Reg. at 59,898.  Several 
commentators have argued that, by requiring parental consent for future use of 
information collected before the effective date of the Rule, the FTC attempted to apply 
the Act retroactively.  Id.  Furthermore, many noted that it would be extremely costly and 
burdensome to obtain consent for information collected years ago, especially in instances 
where the website operator was unaware of a childs past or current age or had no 
information on how to contact the parents.  Id.  The FTC, in response to these criticisms, 
eliminated the Acts requirement that website operators provide notice and consent for 
information collected prior to the Rules effective date.  Id. 
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information is used and/or disseminated, the FTC adopted a sliding 
scale approach for obtaining verifiable parental consent.62  Among 
other possibilities, an operator could (1) provide a consent form to 
be signed by the parent and returned to the operator by postal 
mail63 or facsimile;64 (2) require a parent to use a credit card in 
connection with a transaction;65 (3) have a parent call a toll-free 
telephone number;66 or (4) accept an e-mail accompanied by a 
valid digital signature.67 
In addition, the Rules provide several exceptions to the parental 
consent requirement.68  The first, and most obvious, of these 
exceptions permits an operator to collect the name or online 
contact information of a child for the sole purpose of obtaining 
parental consent or to satisfy the notice provisions of the Act.69  
Similarly, an operator is also permitted to collect the information 
 
 62 See 16 C.F.R. § 312.5(b)(1) (stating that [a]n operator must make reasonable 
efforts to obtain parental consent, taking into consideration available technology).  
Further, any method contemplated by the website operator to obtain verifiable parental 
consent must be reasonably calculated, in light of available technology, to ensure that the 
person providing consent is the childs parent.  Id.; see also Childrens Online Privacy 
Protection Rule, 64 Fed. Reg. at 59,901 (describing sliding scale standard in which 
consent mechanism required depends upon how operator intends to use information).  
The sliding scale approach permits website operators to obtain consent at a reasonable 
cost until secure electronic mechanisms become more widely available and affordable.  
64 Fed. Reg. at 59,901.  Under this scheme, e-mailin conjunction with additional 
verifying proceduressuffices for purposes of consenting to an operators internal use of 
information, such as an operators marketing to a child based on the childs preferences.  
Id.  A more stringent method of consent, such as use of a credit card or print-and-send 
form, satisfies for purposes of consenting to activities that present greater risks to 
children, such as public postings (e.g., in chat rooms and on bulletin boards), as well as 
disclosures of information to third parties.  Id.; How to Comply With The Childrens 
Online Privacy Protection Rule, (last visited March 30, 2000) 
<http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/buspubs/coppa.htm>. 
 63 16 C.F.R. § 312.5(b)(2) (1999). 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. 
 68 16 C.F.R. § 312.5(c); Childrens Online Privacy Protection Rule, 64 Fed. Reg. 
59,888, 59,902 (1999) (explaining that exceptions were intended to facilitate compliance 
with the Rule, allow for seamless interactivity in a wide variety of circumstances, and 
enable operators to respond to safety concerns). 
 69 16 C.F.R. § 312.5(c)(1). 
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without prior parental consent to the extent necessary to protect the 
security or integrity of its website or online business, as well as 
other precautions aimed at avoiding liability.70 
Further, an operator may collect online contact information 
from a child without prior parental consent for the sole purpose of 
responding directly, on a one-time basis, to a specific request from 
the child, (e.g., to provide one-time homework help or to send a 
document).71  When an operator intends to use the information to 
respond directly to a specific request from a child more than once, 
and not to re-contact the child beyond the scope of that request, it 
must make reasonable efforts (taking into consideration available 
technology) to ensure that a parent receives notice and has the 
opportunity to request that the operator make no further use of the 
information.72  Last, the website operator is permitted to collect, 
without parental consent, the name and online contact information 
of the child to the extent reasonably necessary to protect the safety 
of a child participating on the website.73 
 
 70 16 C.F.R. § 312.5 (c)(5); see also Childrens Online Privacy Protection Rule, 64 
Fed. Reg. at 59,903, n.225 (permitting website operators to collect limited information in 
order to protect security of website, for example, from hackers). 
 71 See C.F.R. § 312.5(c)(2) (explaining that this exception also requires that operator 
not use information to re-contact a child and that an operator delete information from its 
records); Childrens Online Privacy Protection Rule, 64 Fed. Reg. at 59,902 n.221.  If the 
website wishes to retain the childs e-mail address for future homework assistance, then it 
would fall into the scope of the exception in section 312.5(c)(3) and require parental 
notice and opt-out.  64 Fed. Reg. at 59,902 n.221.  Moreover, if the operator wishes to 
use the information, then he/she must follow the notice and consent requirements of the 
Rule.  Id. 
 72 16 C.F.R. § 312(c)(3); Childrens Online Privacy Protection Rule, 64 Fed. Reg. at 
59,902, n.222 (noting that sending electronic postcard where website retains online 
contact information until postcard is opened falls under this exception).  However, where 
the operators postcard system sends the requested postcard without maintaining the 
online contact information, this collection would fall under section 312.5(c)(2).  64 Fed. 
Reg. at 59,902, n.222. 
 73 16 C.F.R. § 312.5(c)(4); see Childrens Online Privacy Protection Rule, 64 Fed. 
Reg. at 59,902, n.224 (observing that operators may collect online contact information 
from children participating in their chat rooms in order to report to authorities the childs 
claim that he or she is being abused). 
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B.  Methods of Obtaining Parental Consent 
While most commentators generally support the concept of 
prior parental consent, they differ on what constitutes a satisfactory 
verification mechanism under this provision.74  A significant 
number of commentators contend that e-mail alone is sufficient to 
satisfy the Act, noting that Congress intended e-mail to be used for 
consent purposes precisely because the Act permits online contact 
information to be collected in order to gain parental consent.75  
Indeed, many commentators have stated that, in their experience, 
parents prefer to use e-mail to grant consent.76  Meanwhile, others 
suggest that print-and-send is the method least subject to 
falsification and the easiest to implement.77  Still other 
commentators support the use of credit cards in obtaining parental 
consent on the grounds that few, if any, children under the age of 
thirteen have access to credit cards.78 
Many have suggested that, with proper training, employees can 
learn to differentiate between children and adult phone callers, and 
 
 74 See Childrens Online Privacy Protection Rule, 64 Fed. Reg. at 59,899 (noting the 
debate over whether e-mail based mechanisms can provide adequate assurance that a 
person providing consent is the childs parent).  Because of concerns that a child using e-
mail could pretend to be a parent and thereby bypass the consent process, some 
commentators favored methods that would provide additional confirmation of the 
parents identity.  64 Fed. Reg. at 59,900. 
 75 See id. (noting that Cartoon Network, Disney, and Time Warner, among others, 
advocated this position). 
 76 See id. (listing Bagwell/MTV Networks Online and a child advocacy group led by 
Parry Aftab as supporters of this position). 
 77 See id. (naming Council of Better Business Bureaus, Inc. (CBBB),  Childrens  
Advertising Review Unit of the Council of Better Business Bureaus (CARU), National 
Association of Elementary School Principals (NAESP), Douglas L. Brown, and Don 
and Annette Huston as supporters of print-and-send method to ensure that operators are 
obtaining parental permission in certain circumstancesfor example, when obtaining 
consent to publish childs art work or letter, or to send contest winner prize).  
Additionally, because it is used by schools, most parents are familiar with the print-and-
send method.  Id. 
 78 See id. (referring to commentators such as America Online (AOL), 
iCanBuy.com, Mars, Inc., KidsOnLine.com, and Talk City, submitting that credit cards 
can be used to erect parental master account with e-mail address to be used exclusively 
by parent). 
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that parents prefer this method.79  Yet other commentators support 
the use of digital signatures to obtain consent, pointing to their 
effectiveness, reliability, and veracity.80  Finally, there are a 
number of other electronic products and services that are available, 
or under development, that could be used to confirm a parents 
identity and obtain consent.  These include services that would 
provide a parent with a digital signature, password, PIN number, or 
other unique identifier after determining that the person seeking 
the identifier is an adult.81 
 
 79 See Childrens Online Privacy Protection Rule, 64 Fed. Reg. at 59,900. (listing 
CARU, Center for Media Education, Consumer Federation of America, American 
Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, American Academy of Pediatrics, 
Junkbusters Corp., National Alliance for Non-Violent Programming, National 
Association of Elementary School Principals, National Consumers League, National 
Education Association, Privacy Times and Public Advocacy for Kids (CME/CFA et 
al.), and Aftab). 
 80 See id. (mentioning commentators such as Brandt/VeriSign, Teicher/CyberSmart!, 
Lucas/PrivaSeek, Hill/ZeroKnowledge, and Johnson/Equifax Secure, Inc). 
 81 See id., n.186 (describing newly developing service which employs schools to 
assist in issuing digital certificates to children after obtaining parental consents).  Other 
developments include: 
• an e-mail authentication system that verifies the age or profession of a person, 
and then assigns that person an e-mail address associated with his age or status, 
e.g., John.doe@validadult.com; Mary.teacher@validteacher.com.  Id.; 
• a permission-based info-mediary service that enables consumers to set their 
preferences as to how their information may be disclosed online.  Id.  Under 
this service, a parent is assigned a password or digital signature following 
initial verification.  Id.  The charge to participating websites is anticipated to be 
$0.10-.20 per name.  Id.; 
• a system wherein digital credentials (a certificate, PIN, or password) are 
assigned to consumers after authenticating their identity.  Id.  The estimated 
cost for sites to use this service is $3-4 per customer.  Id.; 
• a service that enables children to make purchases, with a parents permission, 
at participating websites.  Id.  Parents use a credit or debit card to establish an 
account and then authorize the sites to be accessed and the amounts to be spent.  
Id.; 
• a free verification service that uses both credit and bank cards in conjunction 
with algorithms to verify the validity of the card numbers.  Id.  The card 
number is checked at the consumers browser and is not collected or transferred 
over the Internet, addressing some consumers concerns about using credit 
cards online.  Id.  Parents without online access will be able to obtain 
verification by telephone.  Id.; 
• a system wherein parents and children are provided with digital pseudonyms 
that, following initial verification using a digital signature, can be used to verify 
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C.  Criticisms of the Parental Consent Measures 
Many commentators have criticized some of these methods for 
the costs and burdens they are likely to impose.82 For instance, 
some oppose the use of e-mail on the grounds that children can 
easily disguise their identities using this medium.83  Accordingly, 
many of the commentators who support the use of e-mail 
acknowledge that additional steps would be necessary to increase 
the likelihood that the parent, and not the child, properly submitted 
the consent.84 
Other methods are equally challenging.  The print-and-send 
method has been estimated to cost U.S. $2.81 per child in order to 
process mailed or faxed parental consent forms, a cost that gains 
significance when one considers how many parental consents 
would be needed to conform with the Act.85  Another commentator 
 
identity.  Id. 
 82 See Dorothy A. Hertzel, Note: Dont Talk to Strangers: An Analysis of 
Government and Industry Efforts to Protect a Childs Privacy Online, 52 FED. COMM. 
L.J. 429, 441 (2000) (noting that obtaining verifiable parental consent can be costly); 
Matthew Rothenberg, COPPA Kicks Up Controversy: TalkBack Readers Mull Whether A 
New Law Limiting Access To Information From Preteens Will Help Kids Or Harm The 
Web, (last updated Apr. 24, 2000) <http://news.excite.com/news/zd/000424/20/coppa-
kicks-up> (reporting that the Act creates unnecessary hurdles for commercial websites). 
 83 Childrens Online Privacy Protection Rule, 64 Fed. Reg. at 59,899; Rothenberg, 
supra note 82.  One consumer explained that [t]rying to stop pre-teens from using the 
Web is like trying to nail Jell-O to the wall . . . . Each of them has a sister, a brother, a 
friend who has legit access . . . . As is the case with all adult material, preteens can find it.  
Another piece of bureaucratic insanity.  Enforcement should be fun on this one!  
Rothenberg, supra. 
 84 See Childrens Online Privacy Protection Rule, 64 Fed. Reg. at 59,901 (listing 
steps such as use of PIN numbers or passwords, sending follow-up e-mails to a parent to 
increase the likelihood that the parent will receive a request for consent, or allowing e-
mail consent only if the parent and child have different e-mail addresses).  Children, 
however, can easily obtain multiple e-mail addresses from free e-mail services.  Id.  Still 
others recommend including questions in the e-mail to which the child would be unlikely 
to know the answer.  Id.  Yet, the FTC has noted with respect to this last suggestion that it 
could pose problems if it requires operators to verify the answer to the questions, or if 
the child is reasonably sophisticated.  Id. 
 85 See Childrens Online Privacy Protection Rule, 64 Fed. Reg. at 59,900, n.187 
(noting that the cost to open and sort written consent forms is about U.S. $0.08-0.31 per 
child).  The cost per consent by fax and mail, including overhead, has been estimated at 
U.S. $0.94 and U.S. $0.89, respectively.  Id. 
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noted that online subscriptions to a magazine publication declined 
by eighty percent when the magazine switched from an online 
subscription model to a form that required downloading and 
mailing.86  And, of course, there is no way to fully ensure the 
veracity of an electronically authenticated signature.87 
Concerning the use of credit cards, commentators have 
complained that operators will be charged a fee for each 
transaction,88 and that many parents prefer not to use credit cards 
online out of fear for their own privacy.89  Using telephone 
verification may be problematic because it requires operators to 
hire personnel just to answer phones, and would therefore be 
costly.90  Finally, a number of commentators contend that while 
digital signatures and other electronic methods may be promising 
alternatives, they are not yet widely available, rendering them 
impracticable as current methods of compliance.91  Thus, websites 
 
 86 See id. (stating that other offline methods might be too inconvenient or labor-
intensive for parents). 
 87 Id. 
 88 See id., n.190 (explaining that credit cards could cost up to $3.00 per verification 
to process).  One company that has attempted to verify its credit card purchases 
experienced costs ranging from $2.00  3.00 per verification.  Id. 
 89 See Rothenberg, supra note 82 (noting consumer fears that the use of credit cards 
is just another excuse for companies like Disney to compile a list of credit-card 
numbers).  One consumer commented that credit cards were never meant to be used as 
identification and doing so increases the risk of credit card and identity theft.  Id.; 
Childrens Online Privacy Protection Rule, 64 Fed. Reg. at 59,900, n.191 (noting that 
consumers might be troubled by privacy implications of divulging personal information 
for the purpose of granting consent).  Indeed, credit card companies oppose this method 
as well because it could foster unauthorized use and undermine systems used to detect 
fraud.  64 Fed. Reg. at 59,901.  Besides, not every parent owns a credit card.  Id.  Despite 
the risks in using credit cards for this purpose, the FTC has noted that this method is 
already being used for similar purposes-for example, to verify that a person is over 18 in 
order to obtain access to adult materials online.  Id. 
 90 See id., n.194 (revealing that the cost for telephone consents would be $0.97 for an 
automated answering system, the tapes of which would then need to be manually swept 
to weed out children and enter data into a system).  Some commentators have estimated 
the cost of a live operator at $55 per hour plus training costs.  Id. 
 91 Id.; see also Daniel B. Phythyon, Consumer Privacy Issues to Dominate Wireless 
Internet Policy Agenda, RADIO COMM. REPORT, Feb. 28, 2000, at 36 available in 2000 
WL 9540239 (explaining that applicability of COPPA to Internet-capable wireless 
services are also unclear).  Since COPPA was enacted before the wireless Internet 
emerged, it does not yet address concepts peculiar to that industry, such as location issues 
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seeking to continue collecting, using, and/or disclosing childrens 
personal information will need to set up reliable systems for 
notifying parents and obtaining non-e-mail parental consent.92  
Implementation of these systems, including legal and programming 
costs, will be expensive, providing a special problem for small or 
start-up sites93 who will find their ability to compete severely 
restricted.94 
More significant was the reaction of the online industry as the 
April 21, 2000 deadline approached.95  Rather than wade through 
the Acts proscriptions, some companies decided that the best, 
most cost-effective answer was simply to cancel all the accounts 
they had with children under the age of thirteen.96  Other 
 
inherent in targeted advertising.  Id. 
 92 See Brian Ross, Web Sites Must Heed Privacy for Children, NATL L.J., Dec. 20, 
1999, <http://test01.ljextra.com/na.archive.html/99/12/1999_1211_56.html> (last visited 
Apr. 15, 2000) (noting that preparatory steps to comply with COPPA will be expensive). 
 93 Id.; see also Hertzel, supra note 82, at 441 (concluding that costs of implementing 
parental consent measures will effectively wipe out small to medium-size web providers). 
 94 Ross, supra note 92. 
 95 See Lynn Burke, Time Running Out on Kid Email, 
<http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,34453,00.html> (last modified Feb. 29, 2000) 
(reporting that companies that provide free e-mail services are scrambling to determine 
how to bring those e-mail accounts held by children into compliance with COPPA). 
 96 See id. (noting that compliance with the Act will cost anywhere from U.S. 
$60,000-$100,000).  Snap.com and email.com, for instance, have destroyed the files and 
accounts of customers under 13 years old, rather than deal with the Act.  Id.; see also 
Ross, supra note 92 (illustrating problems small businesses will encounter under the Act). 
Ross posited the following hypothetical: 
[I]magine a small start-up Web site directed to children, called 
www.earthdayforkids.com (EDFK). EDFK offers ecology stories, chat rooms, 
bulletin boards, e-commerce links and a feature allowing kids to e-mail 
Mother Nature and receive a personalized response. EDFK wants to comply 
with the rule, but implementing a system of parental notice and consent would 
be far too costly. Therefore, under the rule, whenever a child e-mails Mother 
Nature, the operator may only keep the childs name and e-mail address long 
enough to send one response, then the operator must delete the personal 
information. If EDFK wants to use cookies, then the operator must keep 
childrens identifying codes carefully segregated from any personal 
information. If the codes are commingled with that information, then the codes 
become personal information, too, and must be deleted. 
To avoid future liability, EDFK would like to maintain a database of Mother 
Nature transactions, to prove that it has only responded once to any request 
from a child under 13 and that it has automatically deleted all personal 
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companies, willing to satisfy the Act, devised elaborate plans to 
ensure that they obtain verifiable parental consent.97  
Unfortunately, some found these compliance methods difficult to 
implement and in fact, in some cases, the solutions exacerbated the 
problem.98 
Furthermore, until parental-consent systems are in place, many 
online businesses may opt to be cautious and err on the side of 
overcompliance, which adversely impacts free speech, privacy, and 
 
information afterward. Paradoxically, maintaining such a database to avoid 
liability would constitute the very same act that gives rise to the liability in the 
first place. These conundrums may confound online companies as they try to 
determine how best to comply with the rule and protect themselves from 
liability in the coming year. 
. . . . 
EDFK, under the hypothetical, faces additional compliance issues. If EDFK 
shares childrens personal information with any third party, such as an order-
fulfillment house, EDFK must ensure that the party agrees to take adequate 
steps to protect personal information. Further, EDFK will likely need to audit 
its own internal security measures and redraft its privacy policy to address the 
rule. EDFK will probably have to close its chat rooms and bulletin boards 
because it cannot afford the cost of hiring someone to monitor them. 
Ross, supra. 
 97 See Burke, supra note 95 (describing Hotmails Kids Passport Online Parental 
Consent Service).  This service will give parents options to permit varying degrees of 
access to their children.  Id.  Another e-mail service provider, Surfmonkey, permits 
children to sign up for their own e-mail accounts, but only after registering a request with 
his/her first name and an e-mail address for one of his/her parents.  Id.  If Surfmonkey is 
satisfied with the response, the parent is prompted to fill out and execute a registration 
form, and mail or fax it to the company.  Id. 
 98 See Lynn Burke, Oops: A Barrel of Kids Emails, Mar. 2, 2000, (visited Mar. 15, 
2000) <http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,34679.00.html> (reporting that in 
Surfmonkeys attempt to obtain parental consent, it released complete lists of e-mail 
addresses for thousands of children registered with company).  Surfmonkeys error 
illustrates the extreme difficulty websites face in bringing their services into compliance 
with COPPA.  Id.  Indeed, other industry experts, including David Steer, spokesperson 
for TRUSTe, have admitted that efforts to comply with COPPA will be messy.  Id.  As 
Mr. Steer divulged, I think were seeing the tip of the iceberg.  Id.  Thus, despite a 
companys, such as Surfmonkey, best intentions, compliance can lead to greater 
problems.  Id.; see also Pre-Teen Publishers, supra note 4 (concluding that there seems 
to be substantial disconnect among formal government policy, generally positive parental 
attitudes toward youngsters going online, and acceptance of digital methods for letting 
kids e-shop). 
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commerce.99  And, despite the acrobatics some online companies 
are performing to satisfy the Act, many in the business feel that the 
Act still does not afford adequate protection for children.100 
COPPAs parental consent measures, additionally, place undue 
burdens upon the constitutional right to commercial free speech.  
In American Civil Liberties Union v. Reno (ACLU),101 the U.S. 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania ruled that 
the economic costs imposed on website operators, including out-
of-pocket costs to implement mechanisms that satisfy the Child 
Online Protection Act (COPA), potential loss of revenue and 
closure of websites, and the ability of website operators to shoulder 
these economic burdens incrementally justified preliminarily 
enjoining COPAs enforcement.102  Similarly, COPPAs parental 
consent methods impose economic and technological burdens 
which may destroy small or developing commercial websites and 
which will surely impact the business practices of those who are 
more established.  Indeed, in formulating its opinion, the Reno 
court noted the significant loss of both users and revenues incurred 
by verification schemes substantially similar to those imposed 
upon website operators under COPPA, such as credit card 
verification procedures and PIN numbers.103  In both the COPA 
 
 99 See Ross, supra note 92 (reporting that rather than paying someone to monitor chat 
rooms and message boards, sites may simply close them down, thus choking off forums 
for speech).  Sites distributing online newsletters that are unsure whether they are child-
directed or not might inform every parent that their child has signed up for a newsletter, 
infringing on older minors access to information and privacy.  Id. 
 100 See Hertzel, supra note 82, at 443 (explaining that [d]espite the thoughtful 
drafting by the FTC, the COPPA is not a panacea to the problem of a childs privacy 
online); see also Burke, supra note 95 (explaining that while e-mail options may be 
acceptable under COPPA, some fear it is too weak to protect childrens privacy interests).  
Telephone and e-mail confirmations are inherently dangerous.  Burke, supra.  Clever 
children can sign up for an account using a different birth date.  Id.  As one commentator 
noted, [u]nless a pair of human eyes monitors what goes in and out of [the] account, 
theres room for error.  Id.  Some fear that the opportunity for predation is still too high.  
Id. 
 101 31 F. Supp. 2d 473 (E.D.P.A. 1999). 
 102 See id. at 499. 
 103 See id. at 488-89, 491 (noting that credit card, PIN, and other verification schemes 
impose additional technological burdens and economic costs upon website operators and 
could deter thousands of users from using a website). 
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and COPPA examples, website operators will be under a severe 
financial disincentive to comply with the respective Acts.104  As 
the Reno court noted, however, [a] statute is presumptively 
inconsistent with the First Amendment if it imposes a financial 
burden on speakers because of the content of their speech.105  
Renos reasoning might be no less true when applied to COPPAs 
parental consent measures. 
III. COPPAS PARENTAL CONSENT MEASURES ARE IMPRACTICAL, 
INADEQUATE, AND CONSTITUTIONALLY SUSPECT 
At best, COPPA establishes an ambiguous scheme for 
operators to follow;106 at worst, it is unconstitutional107 and 
provides little, if any, protection for children and parents.  The 
parental consent measures contemplated by the Act do not 
sufficiently take into account the business realities of maintaining a 
commercial website.108  Despite the useful input provided by many 
in the online industry,109 the FTC has articulated rules that 
overreach in their effect.  Besides being cumbersome, the measures 
are simply not cost effective.  Last, and perhaps most important, 
even if a website utilizes the methods suggested in the Act, it still 
will not adequately protect the childs personal information. 
 
 104 See id. at 493 (explaining that financial disincentives can serve as deterrents to free 
speech); Burke, supra note 95 (reporting that many websites are excising whole portions 
of their businesses rather than come under the Act). 
 105 See id. (citing Simon & Schuster, Inc., v. Members of the New York State Crime 
Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105 (1991)). 
 106 See Ross, supra note 92 (noting that various provisions of Rule seem frustratingly 
vague, offering little guidance as to when and how website operators obligations are 
triggered). 
 107 See id. (reporting that COPPA is certain to face constitutional challenges because 
of its enormous impact); see also ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473 (E.D.P.A. 1999) 
(holding that as content-based regulation of non-obscene sexual expression, COPPA is 
presumptively invalid and is subject to strict scrutiny). 
 108 See supra footnote 98 and accompanying text (explaining that COPPA does not 
resonate with business realities and parental expectations). 
 109 See supra footnotes 57-61 and accompanying text (describing comment period 
initiated by FTC and resultant response by industry, privacy advocates, government, and 
consumer groups). 
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A. COPPAs Parental Consent Measures Are Impractical 
COPPAs parental consent measures are difficult to implement 
and costly to realize.110  Print-and-send methods are antithetical to 
the speed and efficiency of e-commerce.111  Postal, fax, and credit 
card fees, when aggregated, can be substantial.112  Although some 
companies are developing new technologies to comply with the 
Act, the end-product usually makes browsing a painfully slow and 
laborious process.113  Indeed, companies will need to hire and 
compensate personnel to oversee and implement these new 
policies.114  As a result, the offline labor associated with these 
methods is prohibitive, for both parents and operators.115 
B.  COPPAs Parental Consent Measures Are Inadequate 
Even if companies satisfy the Acts parental consent 
requirements, childrens personal information may not be 
secure.116  Since most adults are still wary about providing their 
credit card information over the Internet, telephone and e-mail 
confirmations will most likely be the methods employed.  These 
methods, however, are inherently unreliable; children can easily 
manipulate these media.  Considering that many children are 
probably more adept than their parents at utilizing the Internet, it is 
likely that some sort of subterfuge will occur.  Consequently, the 
benefits proponents of the Act had hoped for will not truly be 
realized. 
C. COPPAs Parental Consent Measures are Constitutionally 
 
 110 See supra footnotes 81-94, 96, 98 and accompanying text (describing cost per 
child to obtain verifiable parental consent). 
 111 Id. 
 112 Id. 
 113 See supra footnotes 92-105 and accompanying text (describing attempts to comply 
with the Act). 
 114 See supra footnote 90 and accompanying text (explaining costs of providing 
personnel to implement telephone mechanisms to satisfy the Act). 
 115 See supra footnote 86 and accompanying text (noting high labor costs associated 
with switching to an offline subscription regime). 
 116 See supra footnote 95 and accompanying text (noting weaknesses of the Acts 
proscriptions). 
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Suspect 
Finally, COPPA might be held to be unconstitutional because 
its suggested parental consent methods impose economic and 
technological burdens that will ultimately decrease the numbers of 
website users and which will compel website operators to engage 
in undue self-censorship.117  The Act will serve as a financial 
disincentive for website operators to conduct their businesses.118  
Any statute that imposes a financial burden on speakers because of 
the content of their speech, however, presumptively violates the 
First Amendment.119  Website operators fears of prosecution 
under COPPA has already resulted in the self-censorship of their 
online activities in an effort to avoid prosecution.  This chilling 
effect is tantamount to censorship of constitutionally protected 
speech, and will cause irreparable harm to these website 
operators.120 
CONCLUSION 
Matters of online privacy are at the forefront of both public and 
private debate.  The Act and the Rules are among the first of many 
possible regulatory steps regarding the electronic collection, use, 
and disclosure of personal information.  While the Acts mandates 
only apply to personal information collected from children on or 
after April 21, 2000, the scope of public and private concern 
regarding the use of the Internet by children of all ages is rapidly 
expanding.  As Congress and consumers begin to focus more 
 
 117 See supra footnotes 102-04 and accompanying text (recounting plaintiffs 
argument that the Child Online Protection Act (COPA) violates the First Amendment 
for the same reasons).  Indeed, as mentioned earlier, many websites are choosing to 
delete all files suspected to contain information from children rather than exercise their 
constitutional right to engage in commercial practices under the Act.  Id. 
 118 See ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473, 493 (E.D.P.A. 1999) (explaining that [a] 
statute which has the effect of deterring speech, even if not totally suppressing speech, is 
a restraint on free expression) (internal citation omitted). 
 119 See Simon & Schuster, Inc., v. Members of the New York State Crime Victims 
Board, 502 U.S. 105, 115 (1991). 
 120 See Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 497 (noting that the loss of First Amendment 
freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable 
injury) (internal citation omitted). 
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attention on matters of online privacy, online companies would be 
wise to draft and post comprehensive privacy policies on their 
websites. 
COPPA, however, may not be the right answer to the specific 
issues raised by childrens online privacy interests.  Offline 
schemes, such as snail mail, seem to be an expensive step 
backwards in dealing with forward-looking technologies, such as 
the Internet.  Conversely, online parental consent regimes are 
subject to manipulation by both children and third parties, or are 
tedious and difficult to navigate.  COPPA should work in 
cooperation with web business to be an effective federal 
regulationnot destroy substantial portions of the online industry.  
Although well-meaning, COPPA raises too many problems to be a 
truly effective mechanism to protect childrens online privacy 
interests. 
 
